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The Intellectual and Foreign Affairs: 
The Experience of Walter Lippmann 
LoUIS F. BUTTINO 
St. John Fisher College 
Introduction 
Walter Lippmann was similar to others such as Plato and Aristotle, 
More and Machiavelli, who were not only interested in interpreting the 
world, but also wanted to help change it. 
As such, Lippmann chose to combine the role of philosopher and jour-
nalist. He believed philosophy could provide "the context of his day-to-
day observations on men and events." 1 Journalism, for him, was a way 
of applying his philosophy and, hopefully, exercising a measure of in-
fluence on human affairs. 
Lippmann was also personally suited for the role of "philosopher-jour-
nalist." He concluded from his early, brief experiences in politics that he 
was unsuited for its details . He was, basically, a man of ideas and not 
action. 
Throughout his career Lippman remained committed to the role he 
chose to play. He was motivated by the belief, reflected in his views on 
foreign affairs, that "reason" could be made to prevail in the conduct of 
relations among nations. To him, it was an area too often afflicted in the 
past by bad judgment and irrationality, or ruled even by the unbridled 
passions of war. 
The Relationship Between Philosophy and Foreign Policy 0 
As a philosopher-journalist with a profound interest in foreign affairs, 
it follows that a relationship would develop between Lippmann's philo -
sophical position and his views on foreign affairs. For the most part, this 
was true. Yet even though the relationship was usually evident, it was 
not always made explicit. 
To begin with, Lippmann himself was not always explicit in explain-
ing the relationship . He usually developed his philosophical position 
0 In this section I am particularly indebted to the pioneering work of Anwar Syed, 
Walter Lippmann's Philosophy o-f International Politics, (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1963); and to the excellent analysis developed by Cba1les 
Wellborn, Twentieth Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the Public Philoso-
phy, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969). 
1 Quoted in: Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, The Essential Lippmann, ( New 
York: Random House, 1963), xii. 
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systematically and comprehensively in book form. His commentary on 
foreign affairs, however, mainly expressed in his newspaper columns 
rarely referred to his philosophical position. Therefore, it is not alway~ 
clear to the observer as to how and why Lippmann reached certa in of 
his foreign policy conclusions. 
Also, Lippmann's philosophical position was seldom fixed or perma-
nent. While some concerns remained constant, many of his ideas and 
beliefs represented what he had learned and not what he had always 
known. 2 As a result, there is an occasional "time lag" between the expo-
sition of his philosophical position and its impact upon his views on 
foreign policy . The reverse is also true. 
Despite these, and other difficulties, the relationship betwee n Lipp-
mann's philosophical position and his views on foreign affairs was usually 
observable. This was true, for example, early in his career when his phi10-
sophical view of man's inner drives or impulses, the "irrational" in man, 
was clearly translated into his foreign policy analyses. 
At that time, Lippmann believed these inner drives must be under-
stood as they made themselves manifest. He also thought it the task of 
political leadership to understand these needs and to find, borr owing a 
phrase from William James, "moral equivalents" for them . Leader s should 
not offer taboos nor cater to whims but, rather, frankly recogni ze human 
desires and with a "disciplined intelligence" establish "civilized outlets." 
As a result, a key strategy suggested by Lippman was that of "recon-
struction." In A Preface to Politics ( 1914), he suggested that govern-
ment "reconstruct right relationships" between man and his environment. 
In Drifr and Mastery (1914), he offered similar advice. 
When World War I broke out, he believed socially acceptable "equiva-
lents" for the "uncivilized" outlets of war could be provided. To accom-
plish this, those in power had to "reconstruct right relations hips" be-
tween man and his environment; they must make an effort to make men's 
lives less "cheap and brutal." 
Lippmann initially believed the weak spots of the world ( the Balkans, 
Asia and Africa), where life was "cheap and brutal," were also 1i ch and 
consequently "invited competition and exploitation." To check these 
drives of competition and exploitation, Lippmann suggested that inter-
national commissions be established to deal with specific trouble spots 
( The Stakes of Diplomacy, 1915). 
Lippmann contended there were three great forces at work in the 
world in 1919, reaction, revolution, and reconstruction. He was critical 
2 Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, (Boston : Little, Brown 
& Co., 1943), viii. 
THE INTELLECTUAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 83 
of reactionaries and revolutionaries because, among other things, they 
either put "paradise" behind or before them. "Reconstruction," which 
defined the purpose of his foreign policy commentary in The Political 
Scene; An Essay on the Victory of 1918 ( 1919), also largely expressed 
his philosophical position. 
In the 1920's, as a result of certain issues raised by the War, Lippmann 
began examining the role of public opinion in a democracy ( Public 
Opinion, 1922; The Phantom Public, 1925). The bleak conclusions of his 
studies on public opinion, his attempt to grapple with "the revolution in 
manners and morals" which was taking place in the 1920's, the persistent 
memory of the irrationality of the War, contributed to the publication of 
Lippmann 's A Preface to Morals ( 1929). 
Instead of the idealistic and optimistic "express yourself' approach of 
the pre-War years, Lippmann now decided "control" and "restraint" was 
a more appropriate response. Rather than focusing primarily upon the 
reconstruction of "right relationships" between man and his environ-
ment, Lippmann now believed man "must reconstruct not merely his 
world, but, first of all, himself." Whereas "reason" previously was con· 
sidered an instrument to locate "civilized outlets" for man's "impulsive" 
drives, Lippmann now considered "reason" to also be a method to re-
strain and control these very same impulses. 
The major conclusions Lippmann was reaching philosophically in the 
1920's did not manifest themselves in his views on foreign affairs. Gen-
erally speaking, his views were largely consistent with administration 
policies of the period. On occasion, some of the observations and con-
clusions he reached explicitly within the context of foreign affairs were 
inconsistent with what he advocated. 
With the publication of An Inquiry Into The Principles Of The Good 
Society ( 1937), one finds an important development in Lippmann's atti-
tude toward "reason." The Depression, the rise of Hitler, the chaos evi-
dent in the domestic and international order, led Lippmann to recon-
sider his position that individual "reason" alone could control and restrain 
the destructive potential within men. He was growing increasingly 
skeptical about the ability of "reason" to function effectively without a 
larger context. 
In the 1930's Lippmann was apparently divided within himsel.£ regard-
ing the conduct of American foreign relations. Despite the fact that the 
totalitarians were striking at the major foundations of his philosophical 
position, as expressed in The Good Society ( e.g., that men were more 
than things; that law must prevail; that collectivism leads to global war), 
Lippmann did not urge active defense of these principles. 
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The attack on Pearl Harbor compelled Lippmann to deal with his in-
consistencies and contradictions. He confessed he had relied on the 
"opinions and theories and ideologies of the moment" and that this, in 
itself, was not the most suitable guide with which to make the best judg-
ments. As a consequ ence, Lippmann asserted his emphasis on "the logic 
of human behavior" and a "knowledge of history." The choice reflected 
his increasing attraction to power politics, as well as his search for a 
larger context within which individual "reason" might be guided. 
He was to say ( U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, 1943), 
that the "logic of human behavior" in foreign affairs was largely mani-
fested by those who were principally responsible for the shaping of a 
sound American foreign policy. The Founding Fathers , James Monroe, 
and Theodore Roosevelt, for example , developed a foreign policy which 
took into prime consideration America's national interest , power and 
commitments. 
Lippmann also apparently turned to histo1y for guidance in determin -
ing America's role in the world , as well as for development of a general 
scheme of the structure of international society ( U. S. War Aims, 1944). 
His conceptions are largely reminiscent of the 19th century . More spe-
cifically, they resemble the world largely shaped by Metternich after the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815. In both schemes, for example , the relations 
among the great powers was given primary consideration. Alliances were 
also considered necessary. There was a 'balancer" among the nations of 
the 19th century (England), a role Lippmann thought perhaps the U. S. 
could play in the immediate post-war world. 
Lippmann adjusted some of these historical ideas to what he perceive d 
to be reality. Lippmann's conceptualization , for example, called for the 
emergence of orbital systems of "greater communities" which went con-
siderably beyond the nation-states of 1815. 
The conclusions Lippmann reached in his reliance on the '1ogic of 
human behavior" and a "knowledge of history" enabled him to reach 
some very sound observations about the conduct of American foreign 
policy in the post-war world. His prudent understanding of the relation 
between power and commitments served him well, for example, in his 
criticism of George F. Kennan's "X-Article" and the "containmen t" 
policy.3 
There were , on the other hand , certain limitations with respect to the 
conclusions Lippmann reached, which on occasion made him confused 
or ambivalent. The five great powers that met in Vienna ( Austria, Prus-
s Kennan himself acknowledged the soundness of Lippmann's analysis. See: 
George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950. (Boston : Little, Brown & Co., 1967), 360. 
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sia, Russia, England and France), for example, generally agreed on the 
desirability of a balance among them in order to maintain peace. Yet 
among the orbits, or "greater communities," there was no such agi-ee-
ment That, plus the fact that some orbits did not yet exist ( e.g., China) 
left room for the existing orbits to expand and to test each other. This can 
account, perhaps, for Lippman's ambivalence with respect to the Korean 
War (he at first praised, and later criticized, the American decision to 
intervene) . 
The publication of The Public Philosophy ( 1955) marked another, 
and the final, systematic treatment by Lippmann of his philosophical 
position. It was, in a sense, an apology for realism and idealism as well . 
Lippman expanded upon the realism of U. S. Foreign Policy and U. S. 
War Aims. It will be remembered that his working philosophy became 
one of applying "the logic of human behavior" and a "knowledge of his-
tory" to the present. Now he also talked about "worldly ideals"-"the 
ideals of freedom, justice, representation, consent, law . . . " as being pos-
sible "among mortal and finite, diverse and conflicting men." 4 
Further, Lippmann developed his conception of the world of "es-
sences" where objects are present to the mind; "the transcendent world 
in which men's souls can be regenerate and at peace ." 5 
The realism and idealism evident in The Public Philosophy had im-
portant implications for his subsequent foreign policy analyses. 
Lippman the "realist," for example, continued to subscribe to several 
of the tenets of "power realism." 6 He agreed that politics was governed 
by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. He defined in-
terest in terms of power . He viewed power, international relations it-
self, as a process; a state of affairs continuously in flux. He even offered 
justification for a balance-of-power type system. 
Yet Lippman's idealism, also evident in The Public Philosophy, would 
separate him from other power realists, as well as some of the excessive 
pragmatists who were later instrumental in formulating American poli-
cies in Vietnam. 
In this regard, Lippmann concerned himself with the motives of policy-
makers. He emphasized the needs and aspirations of the Third World as 
a legitimate and major concern of American policy. He expanded his 
support for the United Nations. He contended that America needed the 
4 Lippmann, The Public PMlosophy, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1955), 142-
143. 
5 Ibid., 142. 
6 Aware of the difficulties, semantic and philosophical, that such a texm engenders, 
I nevertheless have chosen to use the criteria originally set forth by Hans J. Morgen-
thau in his: Politics Among Nations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955). 
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"consultation" of its allies. He also acknowledged that he separated him-
self from the school of realists who thought that "to be concerned about 
our legal and moral position" is "unworthy of a proud and tough nation." 
Accordingly, during the Vietnam era, he restated variations of the same 
theme; namely , that America should use its power with "a decent respect 
for the opinions of mankind." 
Lippmann's lrefluence Upon Those Who Ruled 
A key reason why Lippmann tried to develop philosophical principles 
and apply them to the realm of foreign affairs, and that he selected jour-
nalism as his chief means, was that he hoped to shape the course of 
events by influencing those who ruled. 
Were those in power listening to Lippmann? Were they receptive 
to his advice and counsel? The record appears to be mixed. 
At 25 Lippman was selected as a contributing founder, and later edi-
tor of The New Republic. It, and Lippmann, are credited with influenc-
ing such powerful individuals as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wil-
son, and were leading spokesmen for the Progressive Movement. 
Roosevelt described Lippmann as "the most brilliant young man of his 
age in all the United States." 7 He granted Lippmann several interview s 
at his home upon his retirement. 
In 1916, Woodrow Wilson wrote his Secretary of War, Newton D. 
Baker, and suggested he "tell Mr. Lippmann that ... I hope sincerely 
that as his ideas clarify he will let me have the benefit of them, either 
directly or in an editorial expression." 8 Wilson, during that year, grante d 
Lippmann several interviews. 
In 1917 Lippmann was selected by Wilson to serve as Secretary to the 
Inquiry, a secret group established to deal with the problems associated 
with the anticipated peace. His abilities on the Inquiry were noted by 
the President. Wilson wrote to Secretary of War Baker that "Lippmann 
is always not only thoughtful but just and suggestive." 9 Lippmann also 
helped write several of the famous "Fourteen Points" which became the 
covenant of the League of Nations. Following the war, Lippmann went 
to Paris as a member of the Peace Negotiating Commission. 
While Calvin Coolidge was in office, Lippman pursuaded him to ap-
point their friend Dwight Morrow as Ambassador to Mexico. Lippmann 
knew that Mo1Tow would take him on as an advisor. The experience 
7 Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol VIII, ( Cam-
bridge: Haivard University Press 1951-1954), 872. 
8 Quoted in: Charles Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism, ( New York: Oxford 
Unive1sity Press, 1961), 256-257. 
9 Woodrow Wilson to Newton Baker, August 22 and December 14, 1917, copy in 
Lippmann Collection, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut. 
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proved to be one of the most important in Lippmann's career. It has 
been said that principally through Lippman 's diplomatic efforts, war with 
Mexico was averted. 
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson indicated that he was receptive 
to Lippmann's analyses. He wrote to a friend: "I wonder if you ever see 
Lippmann's editorials. Here's one in this morning 's papers which is per-
haps typical. It seems to me they are always full of interesting ideas." 10 
Stimson wrote directly to Lippmann and at one point praised him for his 
"discriminating journalistic work." He said that the "State Deparbnent 
cabled daily extracts of the editorial opinion of the prominent news-
papers, and I regularly found in yours the most accurate and careful 
analysis of the situation and the most thoughtful views as to policy." 11 
Lippmann sent a congratulatory note to Franklin Roosevelt when 
FDR was elected President, but did not always support him. This did 
not go unnoticed by Roosevelt. FDR complained that Lippmann was 
"not always consistent" and said that Lippmann ought to "come more 
into contact with the little fellow all over the country and see less of the 
big rich brother." 12 
In Joseph M. Jones' The Fifteen Weeks , the author discusses the pas-
sage of the European Recovery Program and specifically acknowledges 
Lippmann 's assistance. 13 Yet it seemed Lippmann had his greatest prob-
lems with governing circles during the Cold War. 
James Forrestal, the fust Secretary of Defense, was strongly opposed 
to Lippmann's views of the Soviet Union . He asked a professor to make 
a study of them and then sent the critical analysis along to Lippmann. 14 
Truman simply did not like Lippmann-and the feeling was mutual. Sec-
retary of State Dean Acheson hardly ever agreed with Lippman. Eisen-
hower seems to have ignored him. 
President John F. Kennedy was receptive to Lippmann's advice and 
counsel. Lippmann helped Kennedy with his Inaugural Address, and 
was also asked his opinion regarding Cabinet and other high-level ap-
pointments. Upon taking office, Kennedy frequently invtied Lippmann 
to the White House. 
Such intimacy was on occasion subject to ridicule. Arthur Krock, for 
example, upon listening to a Lippmann defense of the President , stormed 
10 Letter from Henry L. Stimson to Albert Klots, April 5, 1930, in Stimson Papers, 
Yale University Library, New Haven , Connecticut. 
11 Letter from Henry L. Stimson to Walter Lippmann, May 28, 1930, in Stimson 
Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven , Connecticut. 
12 FDR to Norman Hapsgood, February 24, 1936, Quoted in: Edward L. and 
Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Walter Lippmann: Philosopher-Journalist, (Washington: 
Public Affairs Press, 1969) , 79. 
18 Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, (New York: The Viking Press, 1955) , 228-229. 
14 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 
127-128. 
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out of a meeting saying: "Well, I may be getting old, and I may be get-
ting senile, but at least I don't fall in love with young boys like Walter 
Lippmann!" 15 
But Lippmann and President Kennedy were not always on good terms. 
When a Lippmann column criticized Presidential policy, JFK angrily 
asked his aides why he bothered reading press criticism at all. "Well," 
he answered himself, "it's still Walter Lippmann." 16 
Lippmann was regarded with unusually high esteem during the early 
years of the Johnson Administration. Nine days after he became Presi-
dent, Johnson spent an hour at Lippman's home. 17 He introduced Lipp-
mann to a gathering of men from industry saying, "I want you to meet 
Walter Lippmann. He's smarter than all of us." 18 He gave Lippmann the 
Medal of Freedom Award in 1964. The inscription, which Johnson read, 
contained the words: 
Profound interpreter of his country and the affairs of the world, he 
has enlarged the ho1izons of public thinking for more than five de-
cades through the power of measured reason and detached per-
spective . 
According to Hugh Sidey, Johnson used to tell others tha t "the great 
Lippman marched by his side," and often boasted: "I had Walter Lipp-
mann over today." 19 
Generally speaking, Lippmann seems to have been taken in by John-
son's particular style of flattery and consultation until around 1965 when 
the Vietnam War began to escalate . Then Lippmann rather bitter ly 
learned that Johnson was saying different things to him than to other 
people and that he was doing what Lippmann had assumed he would 
not do,-make the war in Vietnam an American war. The relations hip 
soured quickly . 
For his part, Johnson then began to refer to Lippmann as that "poli-
tical columnist of yesteryear." The Washington Post cartoonist Herbl ock 
wrote of the Johnson Adminisb·ation's "War on Walter Lippmann." Said 
Herblock: "If Lippman were a less modest man, the attention lavished 
15 Found in: David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, (New York: Random 
House, 1972), 26. 
16 Quoted in: Time, (December 23, 1974), 57. 
17 William P. Gerberding, United States Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Analy-
sis, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), 78. ' 
18 Eric Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson, ( New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1969), 94. 
19 Hugh Sidey, "The Presidency-The Oval Office vs. the Attic," Life, ( May 19, 
1967), 44B. 
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on him by his chief of state would be enough to turn his head. And if 
he and Johnson had lived in the days of Thomas More and Henry VIII, 
he would have lost his head completely." 20 
There is the celebrated story of how Johnson met Senator Frank 
Church of Idaho, a critic of the War, at a gathering and put an arm 
around Church's shoulder: 
"Frank," said Johnson, "that speech yo' made was not one bit 
helpful." 
"I'm sorry, Mr. President, the headlines exaggerated what I said." 
"The headlines are all AH read, Frank, and they're all the people 
read." 
"But I didn't go any further than Walter Lippmann." 
'Well, Frank," he said sorrowfully, "the next time you need money 
to build a dam in your state, you better go to Mr. Lippmann." 21 
Upon occasion, Johnson's feelings toward Lippmann were couched in 
humor. He told the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists, for 
example, '1 suppose it could have been worse. After all, I could have 
been up against a columnist with all of your talent. Thank God, Walter 
Lippmann never learned to draw." 22 When asked what he was going 
to do after the Nixon inauguration, Johnson replied: 'Tm going to the 
ranch ... and I am going to sit on the front porch in a rocking chair for 
about ten minutes. And then I am going to read a little or write a little. 
And then I am going to put on my hat and go out and find Walter Lipp-
man." 23 
Lippmann did not coolly ignore the President's remarks, nor write 
from his legendary Olympian calm. He said Johnson ruled "like an 
absolute monarch," 24 and that the "fatal obstacle to peace" in Vietnam 
is the President's immature "insistence that he has always been right, that 
he must always be the victor . . ." 25 Lippmann told his readers that 
Rusk's "education stopped in 1944." 26 He remarked that Johnson, Rusk 
20 Herblock, "The Other War," The Washington Post, (May 14, 1967). 
21 Michael Davie, LBJ: A Foreign ObserveT's View, (New York: Duell, Sloan, and 
Pearce, 1966), 24. 
22 Johnson, "Remarks to Members of the Association of American Editorial Car-
toonists, May 18, 1968" Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, ( U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1970), 260. 
23 Ibid., "The President's News Conference at the National Press Club, January 
17, 1969," 696. 
24 Quoted in: "Lippman in New Form," Newsweek, Volume LXIX, Number 23, 
(June 5, 1967), 64. 
25 Lippmann, "The Election This Year," Newsweek, Volume LXXII, Number 8, 
(August 19, 1968), 17. 
. 
26 
"A New Leader for the Orchestra," An interview with Walter Lippmann. Found 
m: The New Republic, Volume 157, Number 24, (December 9, 1967), 19. 
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and McNamara, in their conception of the war , were foolishly using a 
map of Chicago to find their way in New York." 27 
While Lippmann's direct influence upon Johnson and his advisors 
tended to diminish as the War escalated, his influence upon other 
decision-makers and opinion-leaders , and the public, tended to increase 
proportionately. 
He was quoted and otherwise referred to by such outspoken war critics 
as J. William Fulbright, Frank Church and Wayne Morse. Also, Lipp-
mann was believed to influence, and in some cases determine, as David 
Halberstam noted, "critical Washington's taste buds. Lippmann in-
fluenced Reston, and Reston influenced the writing press and th e tele-
vision commentators, who influenced the television reporters." 28 
Halberstam also thought that Lippmann planted doubts in the public 
mind so that when events such as the Tet Offensive occurre d, what 
Lippmann had been saying was more acceptable. 29 
The Limitations of the Intellectual 
There were others among Lippmann's contemporaries who also held 
a high regard for the role of reason in foreign affairs. Yet they also saw, 
like Lippmann, that there could be positive resistance ot the role of 
reason on the part of those who ruled. 
When George F. Kennan left Washington in 1950, for example, he 
wondered whether the government had use for the qualities of persons 
like himself, "for the effort at cool and rational analysis in th e unfirm 
substance of the imponderables ." so Adlai Stevenson, at the very end 
of his life, was similarly uncertain and even more discourage d. 31 
Lippmann shared the experience of Kennan and Stevenson. Upon 
retirement he described the era as a "minor Dark Age." 82 His colleague 
and friend James Reston said that Lippmann "was disappointe d in the 
end." 33 
Yet what was it, exactly, that made the end so difficult for Lippmann? 
Why were those in power not always listening? Why were they, at times, 
unreceptive to his advice and counsel? Could, indeed, all the blame be 
placed upon those who ruled? 
27 Lippmann, "The Misconceived War," Newsweek, Volume LXVII, Number 23, 
(June 6, 1966), 19. 
28 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 26. 
29 Interview with David Halberstam, October 16, 1973. 
80 Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, 499. 
3l Eric Severeid, "The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson," Look, Volume 
29, Number 24, ( November 30, 1965), 81-86. 
s2 Quoted in: Ronald Steel, "The Trouble We're In: An Interview With Walter 
Lippmann," The New Republic, Volume 165, Number 20, (November 13, 1971), 23. 
33 Reston, "His Thoughts and Writings are Very Much Alive Today," New York 
Times, (December 15, 1974), 66. 
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Part of the problem lay in the role Lippmann chose to play. Although 
his expectations remained high, intellectually he harbored few illusions 
about it. There were, he knew, some basic limitations in applying rea-
son to the practical world. 
For one thing, he said that our "rational ideas in politics are still large, 
thin, generalities, much too abstract and unrefined for practical guid-
ance ... " 34 For another, his experience taught him that "when there is 
panic in the air, with one crisis tripping over the heels of another, actual 
dangers mixed with imaginary scares, there is no chance at all for the 
constructive use of reason, and any order soon seems preferable to any 
disorder." 35 
Lippmann also viewed the evolution of reason on political subjects 
still in its formative stages. The advancement of knowledge in this area, 
he believed, preceded at a much slower rate than that in which political 
action is taken. As a consequence, he said, there was "a tendency for one 
situation to change into another, before the first is clearly understood, 
and so to make much political criticism hindsight and little else." 86 
For these, and other reasons, it was possible for important differences 
to occur between theorists who shared similar assumptions, as well as 
between theorists and practitioners who differed in their functional roles . 
Lippmann and Acheson, as an example of the former, theoretically 
considered themselves "power realists." Yet there was little they agreed 
upon in the domain of foreign policy. During the Vietnam War, observed 
Philip Geyelin, both Lippmann and Acheson urged Johnson to '1ead 
more lustily, take more chances, employ his power to enforce his will," 
yet rarely did they have "the same course of action in mind." 37 
Not only are differences apt to occur among those who share similar 
assumptions, important differences could also arise between theorists and 
practitioners. In large measure, this is due to their functional role, as well 
as their personal interpretation and use of that role. 
-The functional role of the intellectuals tends to make them more de-
tached and intellectually abstract in their thinking. The daily pressures 
and petty details, the endless meetings and conversations are not usu-
ally part of their routine. It was noted by Lippmann that in "the empire 
of reason, the choices are wide, because there is no compulsion of events 
or of self-interest." 88 
84 Lippmann, Public Opinion, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1922), 
414-415. 
85 Ibid., 414. 
86 Ibid., 415. 
87Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1966), 133. 
38 Lippmann, "The Scholar in a Troubled World," The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 
150, Number 2, (August 1932), 152. 
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The politician, on the other hand, is an activist; involved and often 
submerged in the affairs of the world. Here, Lippmann knew, the choices 
were narrow because "prejudice has become set" 39 and events move 
swiftly. 
Thus, in the "empire of reason," Lippmann could and often was judici-
ous and dispassionate. Practitioners such as Johnson, on the other hand, 
because of function and personality, viewed reason not only as a means 
of arriving at sound judgments but also-and at times primarily-as a 
subjective instrument for manipulation. Whereas Lippmann was occa-
sionally utopian in his insistence upon rational behavior among men and 
nations," Johnson was often Machiavellian in his motivation and be-
havior. 
It was Johnson's experience as a politician, and his stance towal'd that 
experience, which probably led him to the "conclusion that his press 
relations could be solved by the art of seduction." 40 As a consequence, 
Johnson saw Lippmann as someone who had to be won over by flattery 
and a particular style of consultation. He believed if he had Lippmann's 
support he would most likely have the support of the nation's liberals 
and academics. Johnson was to tell Doris Kearn es: "The Washington 
Press are ... like a bunch of sheep in their own profession and they will 
always follow the bellwether sheep, the leaders of their profession, Lipp-
mann and Reston. As long as those two stayed with me, I was okay. But 
once they left me ... everyone else left me as well." 41 
It is unclear, particularly in the case of Lyndon Johnson, if he was ever 
truly interested in Lippmann's opinion. "Lippmann's a great man," John-
son once said, "because he agrees with me." 42 
Apart from the limitations inherent in applying reason to the practical 
world, and the differences resulting from the functional roles, and per-
sonal style, of the theorist and practioner, the receptivity of those in 
power also depended upon their perception of Walter Lippmann as a 
competent analyst. Could he be counted upon to interpret clearly, and 
to prescribe fairly and accurately? 
The evidence seems to indicate that Lippmann was not always able 
to rise above his own socialization process, which occasionally intruded 
itself upon his judgments of reality. 
39 Ibid. 
" Although Lippmann "knew" that there were differences between the world of 
the theorist, and the world of the practitioner, at times he did not appear to "under -
stand," or accept, his own logic. 
40 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power, 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1967), 411. 
41 Keames, Lyndon Johnson and the Ame1'ican Dream, (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1976), 313-314. 
42 Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the WOTld, 133. 
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Early in his career, for example, Lippmann reflected the orientation 
of the Fabian Socialists and their preoccupation with domestic reform. 
On the one hand, this accounted for Lippmann's lack of interest and 
knowledge on foreign affairs until the outbreak of World War I.43 On 
the other, it accounts for Lippmann's heavily economic interpretation 0£ 
the origins of the war (The Stakes of Diplomacy , 1915). 
Lippmann also developed an early identification with the British. 
Throughout his career he maintained, for example, that Anglo-American 
cooperation was vital to American security. He referred to it as one of 
the "inner principles of foreign policy." 44 
Yet Lippmann's identification with the British affected, and otherwise 
influenced, some of his perceptions. He largely ignored, for instance, 
certain aspects of British colonial policy which were "uncivil." He failed 
to appreciate, for a time, the force of the mass movements which shook 
the colonial world after World War IL He also mistakenly continued to 
believe Britain was a major power after the Second World War. In many 
ways, the role he thought America could play in the postwar world ( e.g., 
that of a balancer), was patterned after the 19th century British 
experience. 
Lippmann's early training with representatives of the intellectual elite, 
and his association with the political elite, helped shape and sustain his 
belief that it was the masses who possessed a minimum of knowledge 
and rationality. This view, though not without empirical support, was a 
preoccupation with Lippmann. 
The result was that he seems to have exaggerated it. Also, he was not 
as critical of the elites as he was of the masses. Indeed, even though he 
criticized Acheson and Paul Nitze, and later Rostow, Bundy and Rusk, 
he continued to express a greater faith in the elites than his own testi-
mony warranted. 
Such faith led him to initially accept, in the case of Vietnam, Admin-
istration rationales concerning the depth of America's commitment and 
official interpretations of day-to-day events. It was only in the latter part 
of the Johnson Administration that he saw how much policy-makers, 
elites with a similar background, had misled him. It was a principle rea-
son for his "disappointment" at the end. 
Not only was Lippmann incapable of consistently1.ising -above his so-
cialization process, at times he readily accepted conventional wisdom 
and went with the general drift of orthodox opinion, or accepted modi-
fied versions of the status quo. 
. 
43 Lippman makes mention of this in U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, 
IX and x. 
44 Lippmann, "The Bedrock of Policy," Today and Tomorrow, ( September 5, 
1940). 
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As indicated earlier, he generally accepted the orthodoxies of the in-
ter-war years. During the Cold War he was generally only a moderate 
critic of America's policies. He had argued vigorously against "contain -
ment," for example, but when trouble broke out in Greece and Turkey 
in 1946-1947, he offered a modified version of it. He consistently sup-
ported NATO which, to some, had become a prime instrument of con-
tainment. He was also inclined to accept, for a time, conventional wis-
dom regarding the nature and extent of the American commitment in 
Vietnam. 
The evidence also indicates that orientations Lippmann acquired in a 
philosophic sense were not always consistent with what he advocated in 
a practical, political sense. These inconsistencies do not appear to be the 
result of a "time lag" between the development of his philosophical views 
and their application in the domain of foreign affairs. 
During the 1920's and 1930's for example, Lippmann appealed to "in-
ternational law," and the "moral conscience" or "moral force" of world 
opinion. Yet this was not consistent with the rather dismal views he was 
developing at the time with respect to the capacity of the individ ual 
citizen having an accurate "picture of the world." Also, even though he 
continued to believe that the public's influence in foreign affairs was far 
greater than its ability ( The Public Philosophy), during the Vietn am 
War Lippmann tried to rally the masses and again made a plea for 
"world opinion," and "international conscience." 
Conclusion 
Walter Lippmann's life and work is a prime example of the attem pt 
to put into practice a basic assumption of formal education which is 
firmly rooted in the traditions of the West. Namely, that the lessons of 
philosophy and history can be discovered, conveyed to others, and have 
a significant influence upon human affairs. 
Lippmann was perhaps a test case of the role of the intellectual in 
guiding human affairs, in helping his country make wise decisions . He 
not only tried to interpret the world, he tried to change it. Although not 
always successful, he nevertheless was, as James Res ton said of him, 
"the greatest journalist of our age." 
